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Selective Memory: British Perceptions of the Herero–Nama Genocide, 1904–
1908 and 1918 
 
MADS BOMHOLT NIELSEN 
(King’s College, London) 
 
This article examines British officials’ perceptions of, and degree of involvement in, the Herero–
Nama war and subsequent genocide in German South-West Africa in 1904–8. By examining 
contemporary British correspondence on this event and comparing it to the British ‘Blue Book’ of 
1918, the article shows that British officials were far more interested in retaining stability than in 
the suffering of Africans in German territory at the time of the genocide. Nevertheless, by 1918 they 
used this event as an instrument to confiscate Germany’s colonies. Being part of a wider 
transnational approach to German colonial history, this article challenges the idea of German 
colonial exceptionalism and the approach to this genocide within a historical framework of the 
Third Reich. Instead, this event should be understood within the wider transnational context of 
imperial history. 
Introduction 
In 1904, after years of oppression, the Herero people of Namibia, then German South-West Africa 
(GSWA), took up arms against their colonial oppressors. The conflict began with a quick offensive, 
where the Germans were caught by surprise, leaving between 123 and 150 settlers dead.1 Although 
women and children were spared by the Herero, cries for vengeance would soon consume the 
colony. In August 1904, the German Schutztruppe (literally ‘protection force’, the official name for 
German colonial troops in Africa), deployed to quell the rebellion, not so much defeated as 
butchered the Herero rebels at the ill-named ‘battle’ of Waterberg. The survivors fleeing from this 
massacre soon found themselves in one of the planet’s most unforgiving terrains: the Omaheke 
desert. Those not killed by the desert were ruthlessly hunted down by the Schutztruppe after the 
proclamation of General Lothar von Trotha’s extermination order. To the south, the traditional arch-
enemies of the Herero, the Nama, also took up arms against the Germans, and soon the conflict 
descended into guerrilla war. Inspired by British methods during the second Anglo-Boer war 
(1899–1902), the Germans established prison camps intended for the entire Herero and Nama 
populations, including civilians. These camps have been labelled as concentration camps, and in the 
case of the Shark Island camp, near the town of Lüderitz, a death camp. The inmates were kept 
under terrible conditions, experimented upon by physicians and used as forced labourers by the 
Germans.2 It is, therefore, no surprise that the terrible events that transpired in GSWA have been 
called the first genocide of the 20th century and are frequently seen in the context of the Holocaust 
that took place less than 40 years later.3 In consequence, German colonialism has largely been 
considered exceptionally cruel in comparison to other colonial powers. This has not only led to 
suggestions of continuity between these two genocides, it has also rekindled various implicit forms 
of the Sonderweg discourse, which proposes Germany took a unique ‘special path’ leading to the 
Third Reich.4 
                                                 
1 J. Bridgman, The Revolt of the Hereros (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1981), pp. 73–74. 
2 For a detailed account of the war and genocide see C. Erichsen and D. Olusoga, The Kaiser’s Holocaust: Germany’s 
Forgotten Genocide and the Colonial Roots of Nazism (London, Faber & Faber, 2010). See also C. Erichsen, “The 
Angel of Death Has Descended Violently among Them”: Concentration Camps and Prisoners-of-War in Namibia, 
1904–1908 (Leiden, African Studies Centre, 2005). 
3 The term ‘genocide’ was applied first in H. Dreschler, “Let Us Die Fighting”: The Struggle of the Herero and Nama 
against German Imperialism (1884–1915), trans. B. Zollner (London, Zed Press, 1980). See also H. Bley, South-West 
Africa under German Rule, 1894–1914 (London, Heinemann, 1971). 
4 M. Fitzpatrick, ‘The Pre-History of the Holocaust? The Sonderweg and Historikerstreit Debates and the Abject 
Colonial Past’, Central European History, 41, 3 (2008), p. 503. For the Sonderweg, see, among several titles, H-U. 
Wehler, ‘Bismarck’s Imperialism 1862–1890’, Past & Present, 48, 1 (1970), pp. 119–150; W. Mommsen, Der 
Autoritäre Nationalstaat. Verfassung, Gesellschaft und Kultur in deutschen Kaiserreicht (Frankfurt-am-Main, Fischer 
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It is inviting to examine these brutalities from a British perspective for several reasons. 
Geographically, GSWA bordered the British colonies of Bechuanaland and the Cape Colony, and, 
diplomatically, Anglo-German relations at the time have traditionally been considered antagonistic 
at best.5 For example, the Foreign Office Blue Book of 1918, a detailed British report of the 
genocide, called for the confiscation of Germany’s overseas colonies by illustrating German 
maladministration. By exploring how British officials in London and southern Africa acted on and 
perceived the conflict in GSWA, both contemporaneously and in 1918, this article will shed light 
upon the entanglement of Anglo-German southern Africa and how these atrocities were revisited 
just before the peace negotiations at Versailles.6 This conforms to the turn towards transnational 
history, which has established that colonial borders were neither segregated entities nor national 
borders extended from Europe.7 Several historians, including Sebastian Conrad and Ulrike Lindner, 
have sought to explore a wider framework in which German colonialism interacted intimately with 
its colonial neighbours and subjects.8 Considering the fragile state of British southern Africa after 
the recent war, however, the conflict in GSWA deeply affected British anxieties regarding the 
stability of the region. British concerns, such as fears of a German-backed Boer rising, emanating 
from the war in GSWA, featured prominently in communications between the government in 
London and the South African colonies. Conversely, there are clear indications that German 
colonialism was inspired by its British counterpart.9 For example, GSWA governor Theodor 
Leutwein often voiced his admiration of Britain’s ‘native policy’.10 Indeed, this entanglement has 
led some historians to argue that there was a common ‘colonial project’ between Britain and 
Germany aimed against the Africans.11 Therefore, to understand the context of the conflict and 
genocide in GSWA, British perceptions and actions therein will help broaden our understanding of 
colonialism in a transnational context, while placing the notion of German colonial exceptionalism 
under scrutiny.  
 Unsurprisingly, the genocide in GSWA is the most frequently used example of German 
colonialism related to the Holocaust – if not explicitly, then implicitly. This is based on long-
standing suppositions that the Holocaust was European imperialism turned on itself.12 In a similar 
vein, Jürgen Zimmerer argues that a continuity rooted in a ‘global history of mass violence’ existed 
between GSWA and the Holocaust.13 Although Zimmerer does not suggest any mono-causality, he 
draws key parallels and structural continuities between the two events and contends that the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Taschenbuch Verlag, 1990). For a contrasting view, see G. Eley and D. Blackbourne, The Peculiarities of German 
History: Bourgeois Society and Politics in Nineteenth-Century Germany (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1984).  
5 See P. Kennedy, The Rise of Anglo-German Antagonism 1860–1914 (London, Ashfield Press, 1980). 
6 In this article, ‘British’ refers to the British Empire as a whole (i.e., South Africa and London are here converged).  
7 Studying Germany and Britain in Africa may be dated back to P. Gifford and W. Roger Louis (eds), Britain and 
Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1967). For a recent 
transnational contribution, see, for instance, V. Barth and R. Cvetkovski (eds), Imperial Co-operation and Transfer, 
1870–1930: Empires and Encounters (London, Bloomsbury, 2015). 
8 Several titles on German colonialism with a transnational scope have been published in recent years. See especially S. 
Conrad, German Colonialism: A Short History (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2012), and Globalisation and 
the Nation in Imperial Germany (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2010); J. Leonhard and U. von Hirschhausen, 
Comparing Empires: Encounters and Transfers in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Century (Göttingen, 
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2011); B. Naranch and G. Eley (eds), German Colonialism in a Global Age (Durham, Duke 
University Press, 2014). 
9 U. Lindner, Koloniale Begegnungen: Deutschland und Großbritannien als Imperialmächte in Afrika 1880–1914 
(Frankfurt-am-Main, Campus Verlag, 2011), p. 254. 
10 J.H. Wellington, German Southwest Africa and its Human Issues (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 235. 
11 See Lindner, Koloniale Begegnungen; M. Fröhlich, Von Konfrontationzur Koexistenz: Die deutsch-englischen 
Kolonialbeziehungen in Afrika zwischen 1884 und 1914 (Bochum, Brockmeyer, 1990); Dreschler, “Let Us Die 
Fighting”, p. 138. 
12 H. Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (New York, Harcourt, Brace and Co.,1951); A. Césaire, Discourse on 
Colonialism, trans. J. Pinkham (New York, Monthly Review Press, 2000). 
13 J. Zimmerer, ‘War, Concentration Camps and Genocide’, in J. Zimmerer and J. Zeller (eds), Genocide in German 
South-West Africa: The Colonial War of 1904–1908 and its Aftermath, trans. E.J. Neather (London, Merlin Press, 2008), 
p. 60. 
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genocide in GSWA should be studied ‘in reference to later developments’.14 Similarly, David 
Olusoga and Casper Erichsen suggest continuity in terms of racist ideas and practices through the 
placement of certain individuals, such as Joseph Mengele’s eugenicist mentor Eugen Fischer, who 
conducted research in GSWA.15 Perhaps the most explicit advocate for German exceptionalism and 
a rekindled Sonderweg is Jeremy Sarkin, who claims that the practices of the Holocaust were not 
only inspired by Germany’s colonial past but were developed in GSWA.16 It remains clear that, as 
Conrad, Birthe Kundrus and, to an extent, Zimmerer have shown, parallels between colonialism in 
Africa and the Nazi empire existed.17 Parallels, however, prove neither continuity nor causality.18 As 
Susanne Kuss has convincingly shown, the war in GSWA was unique and escalated into genocide 
owing to local circumstances, and therefore Germany’s colonial past cannot be generalised as 
having similar exterminatory practices to those of the Third Reich.19 Furthermore, a transnational 
critique, while not automatically repudiating claims of continuity, complicates the matter by 
questioning the basis from which it derives. 
While parallels and, to some extent, continuities exist, it remains problematic that German 
colonialism and the Third Reich continue to be studied within the same framework, because it 
indicates exceptionalism and contains GSWA within a German national historic narrative.20 This is 
evident not only with, for instance, Zimmerer, but to a much greater and Sonderweg-indicative 
extreme, with Sarkin and Benjamin Madley.21 Indeed, Reinhart Kössler has pointed out that if a 
trajectory in which continuity from GSWA to the Holocaust is constructed within German history, 
‘the overall question of colonialism is easily lost sight of’.22 It is impossible here to cover fully the 
extensive historiography of GSWA and the ‘continuity debate’.23 But it seems clear that despite 
claims that the Sonderweg is no longer the dominating view on German history,24 it remains a deep-
rooted historiographical tendency that influences the general perception of German colonial history, 
both in academia and in popular culture.25 
                                                 
14 A. Eckl, ‘The Herero Genocide of 1904: Source Critical and Methodological Considerations’, Journal of Namibian 
Studies, 3 (2008), p. 56. See also J. Zimmerer, Von Windhuk nach Auschwitz? Beitragezum Verhältnis von 
Kolonialismus und Holocaust (Münster, Lit Verlag, 2011). 
15 Erichsen and Olusoga, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, pp. 250–51. 
16 J. Sarkin, Germany’s Genocide of the Herero – Kaiser Wilhelm II, His General, His Settlers, His Soldiers (Cape 
Town, UCT Press, 2010), pp. 20–22. See also Isabel Hull, Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of 
War in Imperial Germany (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 2006), which claims that there was a military culture 
carried on from the colonies to the Third Reich. 
17 S. Conrad, German Colonialism, p. 4, and B. Kundrus, ‘From the Herero to Holocaust? Some Remarks on the 
Current Debate’, Africa Spectrum, 40, 2 (2005), pp. 299–308. 
18 T. Kühne, ‘Colonialism and the Holocaust: Continuities, Causations, and Complexities’, Journal of Genocide 
Research, 15, 3 (2013), p. 340. 
19 S. Kuss, Deutsches Militär auf kolonialen Kriegsschauplätzen: Eskalation von Gewalt zu Beginn des 20 
Jahrhunderts (Berlin, Cristoph Links Verlag, 2010). For another comparison to Germany’s other colonial ventures, see 
also George Steinmetz, The Devil’s Handwriting – Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qingdao, Samoa 
and Southwest Africa (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 2008). 
20 Indeed, P. Gosse sought to establish a ‘conceptual framework’ in studying GSWA and the Holocaust together in 
‘What Does National Socialism Have to Do with Colonialism? A Conceptual Framework’, in E. Ames, M. Klotz and L. 
Wildenthal (eds), Germany’s Colonial Pasts (Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2005), p. 118. 
21 B. Madley, ‘From Africa to Auschwitz: How German South West Africa Incubated Ideas and Methods Adopted and 
Developed by the Nazis in Eastern Europe’, European History Quarterly, 35, 3 (2005), pp. 429–64. 
22 R. Kössler, ‘Genocide in Namibia, the Holocaust and the Issue of Colonialism’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
38, 1 (2012), p. 237. 
23 For recent historiographical reviews, see, for instance, Kühne, ‘Colonialism and the Holocaust’, and S. Conrad, 
‘Rethinking German Colonialism in a Global Age’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 41, 4 (2013), pp. 
543–66. 
24 H. Winkler, Germany: The Long Road West, trans. Alexander Sager, vol. 1 (New York, Oxford University Press, 
2006), pp. 1–2.  
25 U. Lindner, ‘German Colonialism and the British Neighbour in Africa before 1914’, in V. Langbehn and M. Salama 
(eds), German Colonialism – Race, the Holocaust and Postwar Germany (New York, Columbia University Press, 2011), 
p. 255. For an excellent discussion of the implications of drawing parallels, continuities and so on, see B. Kundrus, 
‘Continuities, Parallels, Receptions: Reflections on the “Colonisation” of National Socialism’, Journal of Namibian 
Studies, 4 (2008), pp. 25–46, and R. Kössler, Namibia and Germany: Negotiating the Past (Windhoek, University of 
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Perhaps the most vocal attempt to refute the claims of exceptionalism and continuity were 
made by Robert Gewarth and Stephan Malinowski. By cross-examining different studies of German 
and non-German historiography, they have shown that the war in GSWA was far more similar to 
other colonial conflicts, such as the Spanish in Cuba and the American invasion of the Philippines, 
than the wars and excesses of Nazi Germany.26 Indeed, neither brutish colonial warfare nor 
genocide were unique to German colonialism.27 Hence such comparative and transnational studies 
highlight the importance of understanding German colonial rule in a broader context, in which the 
interactions and reciprocal views of colonial officials concerning violence and colonial rule are 
revealed. 
 It is not the aim here to justify or call for revision of the verdict of genocide, as Brigitte Lau 
has attempted.28 As shown by Jan-Bart Gewald, the intention behind Trotha’s extermination order 
cannot be questioned, despite being criticised by German officers and officials and its eventual 
retraction.29 As Lindner has shown, attempting to understand the colonial spheres as an entangled 
network may complicate the rather deterministic conclusions of Sonderweg-related literature 
pointing to German colonial exceptionalism and continuity.30 Spearheaded by Lindner and Tilman 
Dedering, several works have been published attempting to understand German colonialism in 
GSWA in a regional context.31 These works have revealed how governance in one colony affected 
the governance of others.32 Where this article differs from, or rather complements, the existing 
historiography, is in its cross-examination of the Blue Book, which receives little attention from 
Lindner and others working on GSWA in a transnational light.33 While the Blue Book has received 
scholarly attention, it has not been comprehensively compared to sources from 1904–8. 
Nevertheless, Christina Twomey has made a valuable contribution in her analysis of the creation of 
the Blue Book in the context of diplomatic interests developing during the First World War.34 
In addition to analysing this event from the view of contemporaries, this article will add a 
chronological dimension to the transnational critique of the continuity thesis and suggestions of 
German exceptionalism by showing that perceptions of colonial violence were dependent on 
circumstances and intentions. In the case of GSWA, the official British view can be roughly divided 
into two chronological stages: 1904–1908, and then 1918, with the backdrop of the First World War, 
where the genocide was revisited by British officials in the Blue Book. In this source, we are faced 
with an official attempt to ‘remember’ the historical circumstances in a different diplomatic setting. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Namibia Press, 2015), pp. 84–5. For popular culture, see the BBCdocumentary, ‘Racism: A History’, part 2 (2007). 
26 R. Gewarth and S. Malinowski, ‘Hannah Arendt’s Ghosts: Reflections on the Disputable Path from Windhoek to 
Auschwitz’, Central European History, 42, 2 (2009), pp. 279–300. See also F. Schumacher, ‘Kulturtransfer und Empire. 
Britisches Vorbild und US-amerikanische Kolonialherrschaft auf den Philippinen im frühen 20 Jahrhundert’, in C. Kraft, 
R. Lüdke and J. Martschukat (eds), Kolonialgeschichten. Regionale Perspektive auf einglobales Phänomen (Frankfurt-
am-Main, Campus Verlag, 2010), pp. 306–27. 
27 Kühne, ‘Colonialism and the Holocaust’, p. 343. 
28 B. Lau, ‘Uncertain Certainties’, Mibigaus, 2 (1989). Reprinted later in B. Lau, History and Historiography, 4 Essays 
in Reprint (Windhoek, Discourse/MSORP, 1995). For a comprehensive reply, see W. Hillebrecht, ‘Certain 
Uncertainties’, Journal of Namibian Studies, 1 (2007), pp. 73–95, and T. Dedering, ‘The German–Herero War of 1904: 
Revisionism of Genocide or Imaginary Historiography’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 19, 1 (1993), pp. 80–88. 
29 For an excellent analysis of the ‘genocide debate’ and the extermination order, see J-B. Gewald, ‘The Great General 
of the Kaiser’, Botswana Notes and Records, 26 (1994), pp. 67–76.  
30 See Lindner, Koloniale Begegnungen, and ‘Encounters Over the Border: The Shaping of Colonial Identities in 
Neighbouring British and German Colonies in Southern Africa’, in Lindner et al., Hybrid Cultures, Nervous States: 
Britain and Germany in a (Post)Colonial World (Leiden, Brill, 2010), pp. 2–22. 
31 Also, P. Curson, Border Conflicts in a German African Colony: Jakob Morenga and the Untold Tragedy of Edward 
Presgrave (Bury, Arena Books, 2012).  
32 T. Dedering, ‘The Ferreira Raid of 1906: Boers, Britons and Germans in Southern Africa in the Aftermath of the 
South African War’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 26, 1 (2000), pp. 43–60, and ‘War and Mobility in the 
Borderlands of South Western Africa in the Early Twentieth Century’, International Journal of African Historical 
Studies, 39, 2 (2006), pp. 275–94. 
33 Lindner, Koloniale Begegnungen, p. 252.  
34 C. Twomey, ‘Narratives and Imperial Rivalry: Britain, Germany and the Treatment of “Native Races”, 1904–1939’, 
in T. Crook and B. Taithe (eds), Evil, Barbarism and Empire: Britain and Abroad, c. 1830–2000 (London, Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2011), pp. 201–25.  
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This leads to the question of how the perception of the genocide in 1918 compared to that of 
contemporary views in 1904–8. What follows is an examination of the 1918 representation of the 
events in the Blue Book, followed by an investigation into the contemporary perception of the 
genocide by British officials.  
The View from Versailles 
As the Great War came to an end, the belligerents met at Versailles to discuss the future not only of 
Europe but of the world. Having been compiled in the wake of the South African invasion of GSWA 
in 1915, the Blue Book, titled Report on the Natives of South-West Africa and their Treatment by 
Germany, claimed that Germany was guilty of maladministration of its colonies. Despite the 
report’s propagandistic aims, it has been used frequently by historians as a source to describe the 
horrors that occurred in GSWA. In fact, this source is of such importance that Jeremy Silvester and 
Jan-Bart Gewald saw fit to re-publish it in 2004, the centennial of the genocide.35 After its initial 
publication in 1918, Germany responded to the Blue Book by publishing the fittingly named White 
Book. The White Book attempted to counter the claims of the Blue Book by asserting that British 
imperialism too had seen its share of excesses.36 This reveals the place of colonialism at Versailles, 
where the previous conduct of imperial powers could be wielded as a diplomatic weapon. As the 
Blue Book was published 10 years after the genocide, this suggests the British were either unaware 
of the genocide until the invasion in 1915, or that they knew of it but saw no reason to make it 
known to the world at this time. 
Although the Blue and White Books illustrate deviation between the two empires, colonial 
southern Africa, in particular, was an entangled region. Many British and Boer settlers lived in 
German territory, while Africans, merchants and travellers moved across the border every day, 
bringing with them information and knowledge. Nevertheless, the British neighbour in southern 
Africa has largely been underestimated as a factor in the genocide, with the template of 
concentration camps often considered the only major connection. This fails to recognise the 
complicated patterns in which colonies were shaped by both rivalry and co-operation between 
imperial powers and locals, causing colonial administration to be closely followed by others.37 
Indeed, German officials were sensitive to how they were perceived, especially by British actors 
operating in GSWA and beyond.38 
Such sensitivity reveals that the treatment of indigenous peoples was central to how the 
colonial powers interacted and perceived one another, indicating an implicit ‘code of conduct’ 
regarding colonial rule. Indeed, this ‘code of conduct’ may be traced back to the many treaties of 
the 19th century concerning Africa, such as the Berlin Treaty of 1885.39 In transferring the 
European concert to Africa, these treaties ostensibly laid down the rules for the scramble for Africa 
and reveal certain moral principles on the governance of colonies: principles which, if broken, could 
have potential diplomatic or propagandistic consequences. It was in this context, as well as the 
context of German defeat in the Great War, that the Blue Book was published, as a means to justify 
Britain’s and her allies’ takeover of Germany’s overseas colonies.40 Since the Blue Book was based 
on evidence collected by South African forces on behalf of the British government, it incurs certain 
methodological questions because of its subjectivity.41 Of course, this does not mean that the 
                                                 
35 J. Silvester and J-B. Gewald, Words Cannot Be Found: German Colonial Rule in Namibia: An Annotated Reprint of 
the 1918 Blue Book (Leiden, Brill, 2003).  
36 British Library, 08157.f.8, Deutsche Reichskolonialamt, The Treatment of Native and other Populations in the 
Colonial Possessions of Germany and England: An Answer to the English Blue Book of August 1918 (Berlin, 1919), pp. 
50–55. 
37 Lindner, ‘Hybrid Cultures’, p. 5. 
38 Lindner, ‘German Colonialism’, p. 262. 
39 L.H. Gann, ‘The Berlin Conference and the Humanitarian Conscience’, in S. Förster, W.J. Mommsen and R. 
Robinson (eds), Bismarck Europe and Africa: The Berlin Africa Conference 1884–1885 and the Onset of Partition 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1988), pp. 330–31. 
40 Silvester and Gewald, Words Cannot Be Found, p. xv. 
41 Twomey, ‘Narratives and Imperial Rivalry’, p. 225, and Eckl, ‘The Herero Genocide’, p. 37. 
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atrocities that it describes did not happen, for they did. It does, however, call for careful handling of 
this particular source when using it to ascertain Britain’s perceptions and involvement. 
 Most information collated in the Blue Book is based predominantly on records from the 
courts, reports of trials against locals following the rebellion, and, in many cases, on oral accounts 
by survivors of the genocide.42 While this source material is very useful and illustrative, it is far 
from comprehensive, as it portrays the British as bystanders who knew nothing or little of the 
horrors suffered by the Herero and Nama until the invasion in 1915.43 This exercise in selective 
memory reveals the Blue Book’s intentionally skewed portrayal of British actions vis-à-vis German 
atrocities as they occurred in 1904–8. If the British knew nothing of the atrocities until 1915, they 
could deny any complicity and, by extension, lay claim to the region as its benevolent protector in 
1918. In order to legitimise the invasion of GSWA and to push for the confiscation of German 
colonies, the Blue Book sought to prove that Germany had violated Article 6 of the Berlin Treaty, 
which stated that it was the ‘sacred duty of colonial powers to preserve the aboriginal races of 
Africa, watching over their interests and cultivating their moral and material advancement’.44 As 
Kössler has correctly argued, the Blue Book seeks to depict the moral superiority of British 
colonialism.45 This is further made clear by the statement in the Blue Book that German colonialists 
were a ‘failure’ and have ‘never shown the slightest disposition to learn the natives’ point-of-
view’.46 By portraying mismanagement as intrinsic to German colonialism, the Blue Book claimed 
that it would ‘convince the most confirmed sceptic of the unsuitability of the Germans to control 
natives, and also to show him what can be expected if the unfortunate natives are ever again being 
handed back to the former regime’.47 This served to illustrate that the Germans were not only 
conducting illegal activities in their colonies but were altogether incapable of governing colonies. 
 This purpose, and that of obscuring Britain’s involvement, is exemplified by the Blue 
Book’s portrayal of a key event. In 1907, British forces, acting on German requests, intercepted and 
killed the rebel leader Jakob Marengo, whom German authorities had wanted dead for years.48 The 
skirmish proved to be of excessive violence and was of such severity that the commanding officer, 
Major Elliot, may have coined the term ‘overkill’ when describing the brutality of the affair.49 Still, 
the outcome ‘satisfied both British and German authorities’.50 According to the Blue Book, however, 
the same event is described as a lamentable exception, regretting ‘that even one British bullet 
should have aided in that horrible outpouring of human blood’.51 Contrarily, in 1907 the Cape 
Colony governor, Walter Hely-Hutchinson, believed that it was the ‘duty’ of the British to render 
assistance to Germany.52 Even the outspoken humanitarian Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, 
considered the Marengo affair to be something that ‘ought to be dealt with at once’.53 Nevertheless, 
the decision to pursue Marengo was not made before Kaiser Wilhelm II had personally informed 
King Edward VII, while both were on vacation in Marienbad, that: ‘[i]t is very desirable this 
dangerous rebellion should finally be quelled. Will your government compel [the] Cape government 
to assist us?’54 The actions of the British pertaining to the Marengo affair, therefore, were known 
                                                 
42 Silvester and Gewald, Words Cannot Be Found, pp. xviii–xix.  
43 Administrator’s Office, Windhuk: ‘Report on the Natives of South-West Africa and their Treatment by Germany’ 
(London, 1918), in Silvester and Gewald, Words Cannot Be Found, p. 9. 
44 The National Archives, Kew (hereafter TNA), FO 881/5181, General Act, 1885, Article 6 and Administrator’s Office, 
‘Report on the Natives’, pp. 33–4. 
45 R. Kössler, ‘Sjambok or Cane? Reading the Blue Book’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 30, 3 (2004), p. 708. 
46 Administrator’s Office, ‘Report on the Natives’, p. 15. 
47 Ibid., pp. 17–18. 
48 TNA, FO 64/1645, General-Consul for British South Africa, D.H. von Jacobs, to Prime Minister, Cape Town, 12 
September 1904. 
49 J. Masson, ‘A Fragment of Colonial History: The Killing of Jakob Marengo’, Journal of Southern African Studies, 
21, 2 (1995), p. 255. 
50 J. Masson, Jakob Marengo: An Early Resistance Hero of Namibia (Windhoek, 2001), pp. 52–3. 
51 Administrator’s Office, ‘Report on the Natives’, p. 168. 
52 TNA, FO 367/63, Hutchinson to Secretary of State for the Colonies, the Earl of Elgin, 8 August 1907.  
53 TNA, FO 367/63, Grey to Elgin, 9 August 1907. 
54 TNA, FO 367/63, Ambassador to Austro-Hungarian Empire, E. Goschen, to Grey, 16 August 1907. 
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throughout the hierarchy of the British government. Indeed, after Marengo was shot, Hely-
Hutchinson spared little time in communicating his pleasure, to governor Lindequist in GSWA, at 
the successful Anglo-German collaboration.55 From Whitehall’s perspective, the recent Anglo-
Russian Entente (31 August 1907) had harmed relations with Germany.56 Therefore there was little 
reason to suffer further bad relations with Germany over Marengo’s life. In fact, collaboration may 
have improved relations, as Britain’s ambassador in Berlin, Frank Lascelles, informed Grey that the 
sentiment in the German press was that Britain had won Germany’s war.57 
Another noteworthy British perspective on the affair, from as late as 1916, by historian and 
traveller Albert Calvert, asserts that Britain had justly assisted Germany in killing an outlaw. 
Marengo’s death is portrayed with nationalistic pride by Calvert, as it supposedly ‘fanned the 
jealousy of German officials’ and awarded Major Elliot ‘the coveted Kaiser Medallie’.58 Unlike the 
Blue Book, the views expressed by Calvert and contemporary officials indicate that such violence 
was an acceptable method of colonial warfare. Moreover, Calvert did not deride German 
colonialists for their use of violent methods but for their lack of efficiency in employing them.59 
Thus, while the Marengo affair is depicted as regrettable in 1918, contemporaneously and during 
the First World War it was merely an acceptable act to assist a fellow European colonising power, 
and a moment of which Britain could be proud.  
Further complications emerge when juxtaposing Calvert’s account with that of the Blue 
Book. First is the issue of the treatment of Herero and Nama prisoners by Germany. Second is the 
disagreement on the scale of the genocide. In regard to the first issue, the Blue Book condemns the 
genocidal practices of prisoners being ‘kept in captivity under such conditions that the majority 
died’ and the survivors being ‘exiled as forced labourers’.60 Calvert, however, suggests that the 
labour scheme, in which prisoners were forcibly distributed to farms and mines, was a failure owing 
not to ill-treatment, but to of the ‘perverseness and laziness of the natives’.61 Considering the issue 
of forced labour in a regional context, similar views were expressed by British officials in the 
aftermath of the 1896 Ndebele–Shona rising in Rhodesia, where a harsh labour scheme – a main 
cause for the rising – was, by many, deemed necessary to boost the economy and teach the Ndebele 
and Shona the supposed virtues of labour.62 However, in the shadow of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen 
Principles, overt statements of coercion were ill-advised; the authors of the Blue Book knew as 
much.63 Therefore, German ill-treatment of indigenous peoples was emphasised, while any 
indication of British involvement and consent was suppressed: ‘[c]an anyone allege that these poor 
mild-mannered creatures who had borne the German yoke for over fourteen years had no 
justification for the steps they took?’64 The poorly armed, innocent ‘creatures’, encumbered by 
women and children, did not stand a chance against Germany’s ruthless war machine. This rather 
romanticised depiction, accurate as it may be, serves only to obscure Britain’s actions and 
perceptions in 1904. Though contemporary correspondence and other sources prove that many 
refugees found a safe haven in British territory, particularly after the battle of Waterberg,65 British 
authorities did little to save their fighting men from German persecution, and sometimes even 
contributed to the German counter-insurgency.66 
The second issue, regarding the scale of the genocide, is complicated by Calvert’s estimation 
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that approximately 20,000 Herero died in 1904–8.67 Whether or not this number is accurate, he was 
clearly aware that murder had been committed on a massive scale and seemingly cared little. 
However, such numbers are small compared to the Blue Book’s estimation that precisely 92,258 
people had been killed by the Germans. This rather exact figure is calculated by comparing a census 
from 1877 with one from 1911.68 While it is not the aim here to discuss which of these, or indeed 
other estimations, are correct, there can be little doubt that such disparate figures are problematic. 
Neither of these (and in fact most others’) estimations takes into account a cataclysmic rinderpest 
epidemic which, according to the White Book, reduced the Herero stock of cattle to less than five 
per cent of its original size, causing severe famine.69 While the White Book is equally subjective in 
terms of representing the colonial past of Britain and Germany, this estimation is verified by 
independent papers dealing specifically with the rinderpest.70 In consulting the census of 1911, 
Werner Hillebrecht has also found the Blue Book’s estimations to be exaggerated. However, as he 
rightly observes, an unclear death toll does not disprove the classification of the atrocities in GSWA 
as a genocide.71 Questioning the accuracy of the figures is one thing, but what is important is to 
ascertain the underlying intentions of the Blue Book in publishing those exact figures. Perhaps the 
Blue Book exaggerates the number of victims as part of the wider diplomatic strategy at Versailles: 
the higher the figures, the crueller German colonialism appeared. For his part, Calvert nonchalantly 
refers to the massacre of thousands as if it mattered little in the wider scheme of things. For, in his 
view, and perhaps in that of many of his contemporaries, Germany’s conduct was a messy yet 
acceptable attempt to quell an illegitimate uprising by a supposedly inferior race. 
Despite the Blue Book’s subjectivity, later views on it as a source have been divided. 
According to Olusoga and Erichsen, the Blue Book ‘stands almost entirely alone as a reliable and 
comprehensive exploration of the disinheritance and destruction of indigenous peoples’ in the 
history of colonialism in Africa.72 Lau, on the other hand, claims the Blue Book to be a ‘piece of 
war propaganda with no credibility whatsoever’.73 Although it is certainly a problematic source, it 
does provide us with a detailed, albeit subjective, account of the genocidal horrors. But this very 
subjectivity is the crux of the matter, as it not only constitutes a way in which colonialism was 
remembered selectively, but also shows how it was utilised diplomatically at Versailles.  
 Nevertheless, as the White Book contends, the brutal methods employed by Germany were 
not unique. The aforementioned Ndebele–Shona rising remains a comparable example of British 
brutality in quelling so-called ‘native risings’.74 In this particular case, British forces scrupulously 
used dynamite to blow up caves in which women and children had sought refuge.75 In responding to 
critique of such measures, Edward Fairfield of the Colonial Office simply replied that ‘the use of 
mines [dynamite] is a necessary incident of warfare’ and that the use of such methods was not 
‘inconsistent with the ordinary usages of civilised nations’, which, it must be surmised, included 
Germany, in Fairfield’s and many others’view.76 Therefore, the tendency to employ violent 
methods was evident not only in GSWA, thus questioning the exceptionalism and continuity 
therefrom. Colonial warfare was not restricted to military objectives, but aimed for the complete 
subjugation of indigenous peoples.77 The ruthless quelling of the Ndebele–Shona rising and the 
                                                 
67 Calvert, South West Africa, pp. 24–5. 
68 Administrator’s Office, ‘Report on the Natives’, pp. 60–62. 
69 Deutsche Reichskolonialamt, Treatment of Native and Other Populations, p. 43. 
70 D. Gilfoyle, ‘Veterinary Research and the African Rinderpest Epizootic: The Cape Colony 1896–1898’, Journal of 
Southern African Studies, 29, 1 (2003), p. 136; P. Phoofolo, ‘Epidemics and Revolutions: The Rinderpest Epidemics in 
Late Nineteenth-Century Southern Africa’, Past and Present, 138, 1 (1993), p. 126. 
71 Hillebrecht, ‘Certain Uncertainties’, pp. 82–3. 
72 Erichsen and Olusoga, The Kaiser’s Holocaust, p. 264. 
73 Lau, ‘Uncertain Certainties’, p. 46. 
74 Deutsche Reichskolonialamt, Treatment of Native and Other Populations, p. 50. See also Wellington, South West 
Africa and its Human Issues, pp. 250–53. 
75 TNA, War Office [WO] 33/117, Confidential Report by Capt. H.S. Walker [undated] 1898, p. 99. 
76 TNA, CO 879/47: E. Fairfield to W. Evans, 22 October 1896. 
77 See, for instance, G. Krüger, Kriegsbewältigung und Geschichtsbewusstsein: Realität, Deutung und Verarbeitung des 
deutschen Kolonialkrieges in Namibia, 1904 bis 1907 (Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), pp. 62–3, where the 
NOT FOR CIRCULATION  NOT FOR CIRCULATION  
9 
concentration camps of the second Anglo-Boer war bear witness to this.78 Consequently, as such 
practices and the awareness of their use crossed colonial boundaries, it is difficult to imagine that 
the British had little or no idea of the massacre that happened on their doorstep in southern Africa in 
1904–8, as implied by the Blue Book ten years later. 
Contemporary Involvement and Perceptions 
Historical sources such as the Blue Book are revealing in their own right. However, it is crucial to 
examine the written traces of cross-border colonial administration as it occurred at the time to 
understand the context. The extant correspondence between German and British officials, as well as 
internal British communications, indicate what British officials thought of, and how they dealt with, 
the situation. This may shed further light on how German colonialism, and colonialism in general, 
was perceived by contemporaries. From the sources, four main issues emanating from the troubles 
in GSWA concerned British officials. 
First, the GSWA war was feared to be a pretext for a German invasion of British southern 
Africa. This was especially alarming in the event that Britain should find itself embroiled in a war 
with Germany in Europe. Second, and in continuation of the first, was that the war in GSWA was a 
disguise to mobilise and arm Boer irregulars in preparation for a rebellion in South Africa assisted 
by German troops. Third was the arrangements to be made for the African refugees fleeing into 
British territory from GSWA. Fourth was the fear of a spill-over effect – in the shape of a ‘native 
rising’ – caused by the cross-border movements of Africans, or as a response to British support to 
the Germans. 
The first two issues posed a clear and rationally deduced threat to the already fragile British 
territories still recovering from the second Anglo-Boer war.79 In a telegram to the Secretary of State 
for the Colonies, Alfred Lyttelton, the High Commissioner to South Africa, the Earl of Selbourne, 
estimated that no less than 16,000 German soldiers were mobilised and would soon be increased to 
30,000. Among those, they had ‘recruited between three and four thousands Boers, and are 
recruiting still’. This, Selbourne warned, would put Germany ‘in a position to squeeze us’.80 In spite 
of such cautions, Lyttelton seemingly remained calm when he replied: ‘[i]t would appear that the 
large number of German troops is due to a policy of crushing rebels by main force. For his part, 
Hutchinson says that he personally believe the most “disquieting feature in the matter” is the 
recruitment of Boers in German service’ [sic].81 
Not only does this correspondence between prominent officials display the hierarchy of 
British anxieties, it also proves that they were both aware of, and unconcerned by, the savagery 
inflicted upon the rebels in GSWA. In face of such evidence, the Blue Book’s condemnation of 
German atrocities rings hollow. For when these atrocities were being committed, British officials 
were far more fearful of the mere speculation that Germany would invade, and of that ‘most 
disquieting feature in the matter’ – the recruitment of Boer volunteers into German service. The 
feasibility of an invasion was questioned by the military attaché to the British embassy in Berlin, 
Count von Gleichen, who believed that Germany possessed an insufficient naval presence in the 
region.82 Furthermore, the alleged 16,000 troops employed proved ‘barely sufficient to secure total 
victory in GSWA itself’, as they had ‘too much trouble with the guerrilla war’.83 In time, a possible 
German invasion was deemed improbable.84 
Fears of Germany being a threat to British southern Africa did not occur in a vacuum. On 3 
January 1896, in the wake of the ill-fated Jameson Raid, the Kaiser had sent the notorious Kruger 
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Telegram to the president of the Transvaal, Paul Kruger, congratulating him on defeating the 
raiders.85 This support for Kruger spawned great anger in Britain, igniting the bonfires of jingoism 
and playing a pivotal part in the antagonism between Britain and Germany. Furthermore, the 
situation was aggravated by suspicions that Germany had supplied rifles and ammunition to the 
Boers during the second Anglo-Boer war. In 1904, Britain had neither forgotten nor was willing to 
forgive such acts.86 It therefore appears reasonable that British officials not only considered the 
quelling of the Herero and Nama to be a pretext for a German invasion but also as a possible ploy to 
re-arm and mobilise Boer irregulars. A secret military report from 1905 asserted that Boer leaders 
were ‘relying on certain German promises of assistance in case of rebellion’. However, due to the 
war in GSWA taking on ‘proportions which the Germans never dreamt’, German authorities found 
it necessary to seek a ‘temporary friendship’ with Britain if the Herero and Nama were to be 
defeated.87 The stance of British officials was, therefore, ambiguous. On the one hand, they feared 
that the presence of the Schutztruppe could result in conflict. On the other hand, they were aware 
that Germany could not afford to alienate Britain if they wished to quell the rebellion successfully, 
because of Britain’s naval dominance in the area. Furthermore, with the arrival of the Schutztruppe, 
the number of troops soon exceeded the number of settlers, rendering GSWA more dependent on 
imports from the Cape than ever before.88 On the borders, the co-operation of the South African 
border police was crucial in order to prevent rebels from establishing hide-outs in British territory. 
Yet German troops often crossed into British territory pursuing rebels, enraging British officials by 
violating their sovereignty.89 
Despite the apparent German dependence on British co-operation, fears of the undesirable 
situation in GSWA spilling into British territory in one way or another persisted. A secret military 
report, including an interview with Stephane Kock, brother to former Boer General Johannes Kock, 
may have stirred British fears. Kock explicitly stated that the purpose of recruiting Boers into 
German service was ‘to take men to GSWA nominally to assist the German transports, but really to 
be armed and ready to proceed to the Transvaal when the general rising took place’. Kock even 
explained that this rising was initially to have taken place in the summer of 1905 but was 
continuously postponed, leaving Boer volunteers in GSWA dissatisfied.90 Although a Boer rising in 
Transvaal did not occur – the closest perhaps being the Ferreira Raid in 1906 – the intention 
certainly existed. Counter-factually, one could argue that a potential third Anglo-Boer war was 
avoided owing to the success of guerrilla warfare in GSWA.91 
British officials upheld their ‘friendly neutrality’ in order to make sure that they antagonised 
neither Germans nor Boers.92 However, being on too good terms with the Germans risked 
antagonising Africans related to the Herero and Nama and residing in British territory. Therefore, 
Britain’s involvement in the treatment of the indigenous peoples – whether or not they were active 
in the rebellion against Germany – became intrinsic to their stance on the affair. The flow of 
refugees after Waterberg brought this matter straight to their doorstep.93 Estimates of Herero 
refugees in Bechuanaland range from 2,000–3,000 to 6,000–9,000.94 Steps to allow refugees to 
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cross the border without being extradited to the German authorities were taken as early as 
November 1903, when the Bondelswarts in southern GSWA rose in rebellion.95 This, and the 
suspicion that Britain supplied the rebels with weapons and ammunition, caused great resentment 
among the Germans.96 Such suspicions soon became widespread and were intensified by rumours of 
British agents having played a part in rousing the Herero to take up arms.97 
Due to the continuous influx of refugees, British authorities were faced with the task of 
providing accommodation, food, clothing and medicine. This led Britain to seek compensation from 
the German Reichstag.98 Such requests, however, were adamantly rejected, as the refugees were 
accused of having ‘committed murder and atrocious crimes against the white population’ and had 
only sought to escape a ‘well-deserved punishment’. Therefore the Reichstag was not ‘able to 
extend the principles of humanity to these natives in the same way as European refugees’.99 
Nevertheless, British officials saw potential in the refugees as a useful source of labour, particularly 
for mines and farms still recovering from the recent war.100 Indeed, many Herero refugees migrated 
into the Transvaal to seek work in the mining industry, possibly owing to the poor conditions of the 
refugee camps, where many died of diseases and had little to sustain a livelihood.101 Yet the influx 
of refugees necessitated an expansion of the police force to prevent ‘interferences with native 
waters, which would at once cause serious unrest among our own tribes’.102 In Bechuanaland, this 
was resolved when the Tawana chief, Segkoma, permitted the Herero refugees to settle in the 
Sehitwa and Nokaneng districts.103 Therefore it was not only British refugee policy and their 
disinclination to extradite that saved many refugees. African communities in Botswana and 
elsewhere also integrated them into their society, giving them work and assisting them in rebuilding 
and sustaining their livelihoods.104 
Nevertheless, fears among British officials persisted, that by granting refugees access they 
were inviting ‘criminals’ into British territory, where they could potentially stage a new rebellion 
much like the one in GSWA.105 The anxiety about an indigenous rising being instigated either by 
the cross-border movements of refugees and rebels or through British collaboration antagonising 
African tribes related to the Herero and Nama clearly influenced British actions.106 Thus British 
collaboration was not straightforward, but ambiguous and even contradictory. While Britain was 
willing to assist Germany, it could be done only if it did not antagonise their own colonial subjects 
or, if possible, in secrecy.107 Indicatively, while the refugee camps in British territory were under 
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such lax security that it may have caused resentment among the Germans, they still collaborated in 
attempting to impose control of the borderlands by, for instance, allowing the Germans to store 
weapons and ammunition in British territory.108 Furthermore, as soon as a band of refugees had 
crossed the border, they were disarmed, taken into custody and items thought to have been stolen 
were returned to German authorities.109 
The precarious and confusing situation in the borderlands was capitalised on by many 
resistance fighters, most notably Marengo and Simon Kooper.110 It was only after having been 
granted permission by the British authorities that the Schutztruppe defeated Kooper in a skirmish 
well within Bechuanaland.111 Despite a costly victory for the Germans, Kooper escaped and the 
Germans made a deal with him that he would remain in Lokwabe, in modern day Botswana, far 
away from the border. In return, Kooper received a substantial yearly pension, which the Germans 
negotiated through the British.112 Overall, Britain ostensibly sought not to provoke Germans, Boers 
or Africans during the conflict in GSWA. However, considering this non-confrontational approach 
in the light of both the Kooper and Marengo affairs, the Janus-faced position of British officials is 
evident. On the one hand, they protected refugees and, at least on paper, prevented German troops 
from pursuing them; on the other hand, they assisted the Germans in doing exactly that, either by 
occasionally allowing the Germans to cross the border or by hunting down rebels themselves.  
This proves the precariously ambivalent Anglo-German relationship of the time. On the one 
hand, they suspected one another of subversion, and on the other hand they were willing to assist 
each other in consolidating colonial rule in the region. Indeed, Lindner has suggested that Britain 
and Germany were involved in a common ‘colonial project’ in the subjugation of Africans.113 
Similar views have been expressed by Michael Fröhlich, who emphasised the ‘solidarity of the 
white race’, and Horst Dreschler, who claimed that the most ‘dominant feature’ in Anglo-German 
relations after 1890 was co-operation in oppressing Africans.114 The idea of a shared project gives 
way to a transnational understanding of Anglo-German imperialism, but it is perhaps too definitive 
and explicit to characterise it as a shared ‘project’. A project necessitates terms agreed upon 
beforehand, almost a conspiracy, and while the Berlin treaty or the Zanzibar–Heligoland treaty 
(1890) may exemplify this, such treaties were not strictly followed in reality. In a report from 1909, 
German colonial policy in GSWA was assessed to ‘draw the British along with them in their 
difficulties and they endeavour to impress the native mind that there is no difference between 
Germans and Englishmen’.115 The same report stated that this policy ‘has been aided and abetted’ 
by Britain by collaborating with the Germans against both Marengo and Kooper. This conflation of 
German and British colonial policy alarmed British officials, as it would ‘gradually eat away our 
authority amongst our own native subjects’, who ‘would be of great assistance’ in invading 
GSWA.116 This proved to be the case during the South African invasion in 1915.117 Therefore, 
instead of defining this as a shared colonial project, Britain and Germany in southern Africa had an 
occasional reciprocal, yet always circumstantial, relationship. Official actors operated on an ad hoc 
basis; there was no directive or neatly stated policy from London, Berlin or elsewhere. Yet British 
and German colonial interests, though not necessarily aligned, were intricately entangled, hence 
suggestive of an – often unconscious – understanding between the colonial powers in consolidating 
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colonial rule and stability. Although British authorities were, at times, willing to lend support to 
Germany in enforcing their colonial rule, this came second to securing their own territory. 
 In order to monitor the conflict, the British deployed Colonel Frederick Trench as military 
attaché to the German military command. A move undoubtedly intended to keep a check on the 
Schutztruppe, it also provided Britain with information on the genocidal horrors. Trench was a 
persona grata in the Kaiser’s court, and his many reports almost exclusively addressed military 
issues such as communications, supply lines and troop movements.118 Therefore, his rare accounts 
on the terrible conditions of the prisoners stand out: 
[t]he number of prisoners at the hands of the authorities at Lüderitzbucht, Swakopmund etc. does not increase. 
The Chief Staff Officer tells me that of the 7000 Hereros, Hottentots etc. 500 die every month on an average. 
‘The sea air and the food they get do not agree with them!’ [sic]119 
Trench provides a startling insight into the horrors suffered by the indigenous peoples of 
GSWA. Reporting on the Shark Island camp, Trench noted that: ‘Dante might have written a notice 
for the gate’, unwittingly foreshadowing the arbeit macht frei sign less than 40 years later.120 
According to Trench, the Germans’ attitude towards the use of concentration camps was that they 
were a useful tool in dealing with guerrilla warfare. But the camps established by the British during 
the second Anglo-Boer war were, to the Germans, far more inhuman, as they were used to intern 
white Boers, unlike those in GSWA intended for the supposedly inferior Africans.121 
Given that Trench, and his later replacement, Major Wade, stayed with the German military 
command for years, there can be no doubt that British officials in both Cape Town and London 
knew of the horrors in GSWA – in detail and in real time.122 Moreover, these reports confirmed the 
accounts given to the border police by refugees.123 As a result, Britain was in effect faced with a 
new Casement report. This report of 1904 brought the horrors of King Leopold II’s regime in the 
Congo Free State to light and subsequently led to major public protests. As a result, the Foreign 
Office under Grey successfully pushed for the Belgian government to take control of the Congo. 
Such similarity is also apparent when Grey simply noted, on the front page of the aforementioned 
1909 report, that the situation in GSWA was ‘as bad as the Congo’.124 Unlike his Belgian 
contemporary, Kaiser Wilhelm and the German nation were spared the anger of the British public 
and media, despite committing a full-scale genocide.125 Arguably, the suspicion towards 
imperialism in Africa brought about by the Congo crisis affected British officials in their dealings 
with GSWA, as they did little to acknowledge the horrors unfolding. This indicates a reluctance to 
put imperialism, whether British or German, under further scrutiny. Indeed, another comment to the 
above 1909 report stated that it was not ‘necessary to send this report to Berlin’.126 This reluctance 
implies an understanding between the colonial powers pertaining to the stability of colonial rule, 
whether in metropolitan Europe or in the colonies themselves. This does not indicate a project, but 
rather suggests a subtle mutual understanding.  
Such an understanding, however, was ignored by Britain when they saw fit to use their 
knowledge of the genocidal horrors as a diplomatic instrument in 1918, claiming that Germany was 
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an exceptional and incompetent colonial power. This conveniently came at a time when Germany 
was widely seen as an aggressor, owing to its belligerent role in the First World War. This was true 
not only in Europe but also in GSWA, with reports of African prisoners of war being severely 
mistreated and mutilated by the Germans.127 Therefore, any complaints from the Germans about 
British misdemeanours in Africa, as portrayed in the White Book, could easily be deflected by 
pointing to German excesses.128 Whereas the British government saw relatively little trouble in 
launching a humanitarian campaign against Leopold II, they had little motive do so against 
Germany prior to the war. Of course, individual condemnations of the genocide were voiced in both 
London and the Cape, but, overall, official humanitarian concerns and views of the atrocities were 
subjected to broader realpolitik concerns. Germany was ‘a boy too big to interfere with’.129 With the 
outbreak of the Great War, however, these realpolitik obstructions were not only removed, but 
changed in favour of a smear campaign advocating humanitarian concerns over German colonialism 
as a whole. 
Conclusion 
British officials were mainly concerned with security issues emanating from the situation in GSWA, 
which could affect their territory. Thus, Britain’s policy of ‘friendly neutrality’ was aimed at 
avoiding any ramifications and assisting the Germans in ending the situation promptly. As a result, 
their detailed knowledge of the immense suffering of the indigenous people of GSWA was ignored 
in 1904–8. Although British officials were concerned with German ‘native policy’, this concern was 
not primarily aimed at the actual suffering of the Herero and Nama people, but rather the 
consequences of Britain’s complicity. It cannot be defined as a shared project, but it indicates a 
common Anglo-German standpoint on colonialism and colonial violence. Cross-border activities 
reveal a transnational co-operation between Britain and Germany, which may be interpreted as a 
mutual understanding regarding colonial administration and the quelling of ‘native risings’ in order 
to obtain stability. Such understanding and consent was purposely ignored in the aftermath of the 
First World War, as it would undermine any claims to confiscate Germany’s overseas territory. 
Therefore it is crucial to ascertain the premises of the Blue Book, as a source not only to the events 
in GSWA themselves but also to Britain’s perception and involvement and to British diplomatic 
aims in 1918.130 This source contains significant biases and limitations, and hence contemporary 
British involvement and knowledge is portrayed in a way favourable to the diplomatic situation at 
Versailles rather than southern Africa in 1904–8.  
While the colonial scandals as portrayed in the Blue Book were not directly responsible for 
the confiscation of Germany’s colonies, it did, as Frank Bösch has shown, help to create an image 
of the ‘brutal German’ which ‘impacted on Germany’s reputation well after 1918’.131 Arguably, the 
idea of German colonial exceptionalism and the associated colonial Sonderweg, therefore, rests 
upon what may be called the legacy of the Blue Book.132 Valuable as it may be, the Blue Book does 
not represent a contemporary perception of colonialism and violence in GSWA. As it does not 
adhere to the views expressed by British actors in 1904–8, it is a source representing, when 
scrutinising British views on German colonialism, a selective memory. Indeed, prior to the outbreak 
of the First World War, German colonialism was, in general, considered acceptable and legitimate, 
particularly since Britain too was embroiled in several colonial scandals.133 Many groups, such as 
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the Aborigines’ Protection Society, even advocated the transfer of Belgian and Portuguese 
territories to German rule, as well as British and French, as late as 1912.134 All this only a few years 
after British officials received detailed reports on the genocide in GSWA.  
The portrayal of the genocide in the Blue Book has historiographic implications. The 
Germans were not unique in their lack of concern for the immense suffering of Africans in their 
efforts to crush ‘native rebellions’ when these threatened colonial rule. Furthermore, cases of direct 
complicity, exemplified by the brutal killing of Marengo, are undeniable and suggest that Britain’s 
stance of ‘friendly neutrality’ may have been too friendly. In the light of recent scholarship seeking 
to uncover transnational patterns, notions of German exceptionalism and continuity seem old-
fashioned and problematic. In Africa, Germany was Britain’s ‘entangled other’: on the one hand 
they were competitors but, on the other, they were collaborators in the violent subjugation of 
African dissidents. Therefore, British and German southern Africa cannot be seen as two separate 
entities.  
 The aim of this article has been to complement preceding scholarly contributions seeking to 
uncover the relations between Britain and Germany, and to enter the historiographical debate 
concerning the claims of continuity, parallels, causality and, especially, exceptionalism. As such, it 
has not been the purpose to refute either that the Third Reich had or had not any colonial roots. 
Instead, it makes the case for understanding the history of imperialism within a context where it is 
not contained by European national narratives, such as that of German exceptionalism.135 Therefore, 
it is important that we continue to seek to understand German colonial history within its wider 
international and imperial framework and not as part of an obsolete and ethnocentric model that is 
no longer being applied to study other countries’ imperial histories.136 To re-work John Seeley’s 
classic, The Expansion of England (1883), it is perhaps time that we moved beyond studying 
German colonialism as ‘The Expansion of Germany’. 
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